Oberlin

Digital Commons at Oberlin
Honors Papers

Student Work

1977

The Notion of Complexity in the Study of Interest-Group Pluralism
William Frank Jeffers
Oberlin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors
Part of the Political Science Commons

Repository Citation
Jeffers, William Frank, "The Notion of Complexity in the Study of Interest-Group Pluralism" (1977). Honors
Papers. 728.
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/728

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu.

THE N0 rION OF COMPLEXITY
1

IN TJ-fE STUiDY OF INTEREST-GROUP

PLURALISM

William Jeffers
May, 1977

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to develop the notion '. of

complexit? as a conceptual tool for a comparative analysis
of the proponents and critics of Interest-Group Pluralismo
The primary question I will attempt to answer concerns the
'Nays in which these proponents and critics differ in res-

pect to their :conceptions of (a) analytical complexity,
(b) descriptive complexity and, (9) prescriptiv~ complexity.

Important to note at the outset of this essay are its
limitations.

First, it is not possible to cover all of the

proponBnts and critics of Interest-Group Pluralism in this
essay, for the amount of literature is massive.

What I will

attempt to cover is a sampling of' those so-called ''plural~ .
ists .. and "anti-pluralists" who concern themselves with urban
and community politicso
Second, the terms "pluralist" and .. anti-pluralist" used
to describe two categories of po).itical analysis have some
difficulties~

The terms are primirily used in this essay for

the sake of clarity.
Third, although pluralists differ from anti-pluralists
in many ways, I have chosen to discuss these differences. in
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terms of complexity.

I do not intend to imply that the use

of the notion of complexity is the only way, or even the be st
way, to differentiate these two c~tegories of pdlitical
analysis.
Fourth, because the emphasis of this essay is on the
differentiation between pluralists and anti-pluralists, it is
not possible to cover all the salient issues concerning the
notion of complexity.

I will attempt to focus on those aspects

of complexity which I believe are the most relevant to the
pluralist/anti-pluralist controversyo
For the purposes · of this essay, the term

O

complexl ty••

will be used to describe the extent to which the following
. . d 1
f ac t ors are maximize:
(1) the number of unit s , (size)

(2) the differeritiation of t hese units, (differentiation)

(3) the incidence of relational interdependencies among
these units , (interdependence)
(a) the overlapping of units performing different

functions
( b) the .incidence of functional redundancy.among

..ri~--,4(__

~

these units

(4) the variability of the above factors over time. t
(variability)
The term "simplicity" will be used to describe the extent to
which ~he above factors are minimizedo
The operationalization of ·the notion of complexity is
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somewha t problem atic in that the factors of complex ity are
non-add itiveo

McFarland contend s:

If one system has fewer compone nts, but greater interdepen dence and variabi lity (i.e., chan~s in degree
of deffere ntia tion over time), than another, · it vm uld
be difficu lt or impossi ble to determin e which system is
more complex , unless the system with fewer v~riabl es is
identic al to a subsyste m of a second system. ~
McFarla nd goes on to assert that in order to compare systems
on the basis of complex ity, we must demonst rate that "one
system exhibits a greater magnitud e than the other on all
three dimensio ns of complex ity.,.3
LaPorte argues (and I agree) that McFarla nd is overly
impresse d with the difficu lties in comparin g the degree of
complex ity in differen t systems .

Althouig h the non-add itive

qual_i ty of complex ity does make compari sons methodo logicall y

tricky. it shoula not present an insurmo untable problem in
operatio nalizing the notion of complex ity to differe ntiate
.
1·t·ica1 ana 1yses.
po~i

'+

Importa nt to note is that the notions of complex ity and
simplic ity are abstrac tions and should be viewed as opposite
ends on a theoret ical continuu m.
The heurist ic advantag e in distingu ishing between complex ity and simplic ity is th~ explica tion of the concept ual possibility of either case; it is not to quantify the relative
degree of complex ity in order to compare it with another struc-,
ture.

Thi~ essay will be divided into four section s to _discuss
the relevanc y of four distinc t categor ies of complex ity/
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simplicity to the political analyses of pluralists and antipluralists.

.

These four categories are as follows;

5

(1) structures of political interaction (structural complexity)
(2) variables or concepts used in political analysis

(analytic complexity)

(3) description of structures of interaction (descriptive complexity)
(4) ~prescriptions for structures of interaction {prescriptive complexity)
While others have used slightly different categories to analise complexity, I believe that these categories make for the
most useful distinction between pluralists and anti-pluralists.
In the first section on structural complexity, I will
analyse the theoretical possibility of complexity in concrete
structures of interaction~

While this theoretical analysis

of structural complexity is abstract , the jmportance of it is
to conceptualize the constituent factors of complexity/simpli- _
cityo

These factors will be utilized in the discussions of ·

the other three asp~cts of complexity .

In the second section, the discussion on analytic complexity will ~eal with two aspects of complexity in political analyses:

(1) the number and differentiation of variables

or concepts used in political analyses, and (2) the complexity/simplicity of the structure of analytice frameworks.

., -

5

The first aspect will be used to describe the methodologic al
comp1exity of a particular analysis: the second, the complexity of structures of analytical frameworks of a ' particular
category of analysis.

In this context, pluralists and anti--

pluralists will be examined both in terms of particular anal~
yses and of -the structure of pluralist and anti-plurali st an-alytical frameworks.
In the third section, the distinction will be made between th~ descriptions of the political process as seen in
It will be use-

the works of pluralists and anti-plurali sts.

ful to distinguish between what I have termed "descriptive
pluralists .. and "descriptive anti-pluralis .ts

0

~

The ·former

describes the political process as being relatively complex;
the latter, as being relatively simplec
In the fourth section, the distinction between °descriptive" and "prescriptiv e" pluralists and anti-plurali sts will
be clarified.

Here again, prescriptive pluralist prescribes

complexity for the political process;

the prescr.:j.,pt_ive

anti-plurali st prescribes simplicityo

Whil~ it may be some-

times difficult to distinguish the difference between the
normative judgments and the descriptions of the political
process made by particular political an~lists, I will ~ttempt
to make this d~fferentiat ion as clear as possible.
It is important to note that I do not intend to make any
overt judgments on the verity of the pluralist or anti-pluralists arguments; rather, I intend to demonstrate how trade-offs

..

.

·;

'

6,·

on an a.Da.1are made when the poli tica l scie ntis t emba rks
men t will be
ysis of the poli tica l proc ess. Whil e this argu
t to note that
deve lope d thr~ ugho ut this essa yt it is impo rtan
of inte ract ion
the meth od of appr oach ing conc r~te stru ctur es
on of thes e
affe cts the com plex ity/s imp licit y of desc ripti

stru ctur e so
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'

'i.'b.:: -ce~·;r: "structur~ l

cor;;:pL:.:xity" :is used h;.:1re to sign.l.fy the ex:0r: t
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The first factor, the size of che structure, is •i eter-

.l.·
mined by tha number of individuals :performing roles. However •. the m1Jn':Jer

of people performing roles is only one aspect of structural complexity.

In

the case of a large typing pool, for example> :where all the indi vidi.:.als

are typing form letters, we would not consider this structuxe complex, for
they are all pert·orming the sarae role.

STRUCTURAL con?LEXITY .. -DI??EREl:TI .t..TION

Tha di:£'erentiatlon of roles withir: the structure is tha secon.d f3.cl:-o:·: of struchtral complexlty.
r,li·,~r.
-- -

t-'1 e

J:-'-

-l,~

mul_...,,...-i1c
.i.
v-j!....,_ ·i 't~·
.} o=·
.,.

Ths maxi mi z;ation of the diff:~renti.s :t.bn Ln-

l ii·f·-f'c,-r.:.-.,-,.:.
...J...;.,_c;,. .. 1.,

-"",u,·--ti"·Jnal
""Ole-=:. ·
d::.,
'
....

performed within the structure.
w:1y-

in

J...

~

.._.,.

::;i,-.·?.i·v1'..l..1·,::,c,
c,.,._.(.,_
. I.,
...,.::,,

•J

This is not to say --~hat the

r,rhich an ind.i vidual pr:::rfo.rms a rols doe.3 not alter the role i tsc::lf ; ·

rathar, the individual · acts within the col\fines of the roL3.

of that role become more of
r,,ri thin

,..:,...:..C
~,., .

ai1

a factor

The const?-~ ints

as the role becomes more formalized

in_;::.ti tutional structure.

In informal structures, we may say that the prescribed activitie;s
of the roles are largely determined by the individual.

In forrr.al stri;.c-

tures, on the other hand. the activities of the role are largely prescrn:ed
by the institution.

That institutional structures have both forJ:.al ar..<-!

infoYmal dnractc;ristics D.aJces the importance ·of the prescribed functio~s

.'

by the :p:!:'escrib::d activities of' th~ :role a.nd by tha l.n:li villual :p·2r:::·or::ling

- b. y -r,n:eo:r·isT. s a.;.~a.J...Y ;::>J..~
!
A co.:n.r;ion argt:.ment, ma.de
16 ~ne notion of cc~I

,

._,

4""1 ~..-l •

j

.,

"t .,,..._

,r,. ,..,

plexity, states that the· maximization of the di:fferen:tiation of roles

denotes the minimization of the fu..'1ctional redundancy of these rol8s.

However, this argument appears to be fallacious, for t-;..ro reasons.

7he

first reason i3 derived from the asstuaption stated above that the indi-:-viduaJ. perfo11ming a role alters the function of that role~

In-this way,

tha prescribed function of the role, itself,· is t:1e same wheri it is a.scri·bed to two ;individuals, but the ·way i:::1 which the f,. rriction is· 'cir::-ied

out may be different.
The second reason is derived from the conTnm1 u2a.ge of t:--,.e safc~ty
If the prescribed function o.::' a role is considered iL:port:mt 1 it is :111lE:ely that o:1e- person will ·be en:.ru::;ted. with tha cofiplete

re:..,ponsi bili ty of that functional. role.
~-(11 ::~ 0

s are ma.nifold.

H1xarr. ples of these safety r:.ech-

To use a mechanistic raferencet additional fea-

tu:;1:;s of a highly complex mac:1ine a:ce often used to ensure that t;i,e p:ri-m2.ry function of that machb.e is performed.

These· 0 sa.:ety

ar2 utilized when a pa....--t o:: the machine breaks

c. oFn ..

•

•

mecnanisms

0

In an exa;nple

:found in nature, we see that when one s~pecies becomes extinct, a.:.'1otha:r
species tha...1-<as its place in the food. chain.

While I coulJ. cartainly be wrong in my observation, it appears that
.theorists andysing the notion of COi?\plexity hava inco:;..."'Tectly owitted the
concept of redu.1:::iancy in their defini ticus of com_plexi ty.

Thdir defi:-ri-

9

ti u:is of com;,L ~:-.:i t y irr:.Jly r igidity

2..nd

fragility ~-r~i. ic:~ m?,.y not pro 2 erly

The third factor of' structural ··ccrnple;x:ity··involves the incide.n ce · o::
relational interdependencies among actors performing rol~s.

3y the terr.1

uinterdependence;' the essential implication to be ma.de concerns the m.ut·1al exercise of powe:r amori.g ir:dividuals performing roles within the or-

ganized st~ucture.
The term "power" is used to describe the ability of one individual
or group to overc,::rnre the resista:.'1ce of another indi vid'..12J. o:r group.

Iha

amount of power ascribed to an individual or group is relative to that
held ·by ·other indi vicluals or groups, .for tie active utilization of poiier

i:1Volves ::;one kind of relationship between individuals or groups . 3

Since t~:.s conc8ptim1 of power exists only ir. re::.s.:tionshi:ps "2etween
:iudi"1id.ua1s o; gr,:rn; s, -r..r. ,e re ar:e three necessary condi tion3 existent in
1

First , there must be an ir. :i.ti2,.l ccin:flict of inte:rest or value. ~et:.-reen bro or more perso:rrs or groups .

I: there were no

there would be no resista..r-1ce to be overcor:1e, an,i there would l.'t
:Go ne0d for tha utilization of power in

that relationship.

Secondt the

power relatio:c.ship can o!'lly exist is at least one of the parties . posses~3es
];Ower asset3-.- --tr1a ability to invoke Ganctions, to prm::ise rewards, and

to suppress or change opinions .

In any power rela-tio11ship, ar1y one , or a

coi-ri"bination o:f thsGe abilities , are utilized.
ship only ex~ - t~ -.-ht.

Third, the power relation-

· -=:rson~ po _, ~es.3 · !lP-" power ass t s ut.L i e ":-;e : in

fi(J~rer.
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-

t>

Coerci v2

th::-citaning or tha
phJsical force.

UGe

f-O'dBr

involves th3-

of violent intervsntion with the actual use of

Al though th~ threatening of the use of force is analy-

tically distinct from its actual usage, both are included in this type
of po-..·1er relationship.

:foen viole":.1ce Ls threatened, the individual sub...

·jected to this type of power has the choice of complia.:n.ce or non~complia.nce
:-Tith t:1e demands of the individual making the threat.

However, 1-Then _force

is d.i:rectly utilized, the individual subjected to this ::orce no longer

has this choice.

ft>

Utilit.3.ria.n :power is activated when assets1 such as

fl

. • ·economic._·

;)oss2:3sions, technical and a.dninistratl Ve ca:pabi.li ties, r:1a.t,._powe:r, e +c
y

a.L';2; utilized to get1erate suF;>vsrt ot a pariicula:r line of actiori.

.

Tl1is

rewD.rding or the l)er.allzir:g of tha su~jected

of pm-ier ::.nvol ves
i:-div:'...dua1.

i
ir

.,

~Iis cho:i.ce to cora:.;:ly is conti~1g-ent 1won thr~ pe:rcei ved nee,
lo'
.~
rewarus
of ·...,nese

A normat.i ve :po~fer relationship involves both the usage of persuasion

&"ild h1f1 uence ·to fu::cthe:r a particular actiqn .

"F ersuasive . power is ex-

e:~~ci sed through the manipulation of symbols , such as appeals to . the value2.
cL:.d !:-,e1:tim.ents of the c iti zens, in order to mo 'bil.ize support and to

.re11-

q
a·lize those ".dho deviate ."

This type of · persuasion is considered a : or2

of po:-ra:r in that it lessens the rcs:i.stance to a pa.rticLJ..ar action.
The use of

·i

-r.-i'lu;:-nce does not. rely on the threatened usage of sane-

ti ons or re~,.rarcts to overcome resl~;i:,ance ; rathd:r, it relies upon ''an

..
11

,.,
cha.Ylge

_I

.1.r1es

in the .:-1<:;_to~r~ ' ts prefei-.i::nce:.;. '1

lJ"~J~i}·:e

l1i~J pr~3:ferences.

Every concrete usage of power consists i.n ths usage of one or a
combination of these categories of power relationship.

u

However, th2 pre-

dohinate use of one of these catagories of power will haY'3 effects upon

t~1e stratification· or interdependence of those concrete structures of"

int2raction.

~·tzio_1i _argues t-hat as the poJtrer rel:=.ttionsQips -become more

cx::rci va a.--id le:ss normati va, hierarchic.aJ. patterns of orga."'lization are
rr:o.re

_prevalent •

As these rel3.tionshi::ps become :n:.ors norrr,a.ti ve, the level

o·; forrilal, social ranking will decrease and mobility ·:;·111 increas3 .

~

1

Thus t if Etzioni is correct ia his observation, the :pr3vailing tyfa
of pow3r rels.tionships wil::!. have an ef.::"sct upon V1e in'.~id.:mce of r:mt1,,.;.a.l
dep;:mdencies.. 1-foiJ.e we are not in ,::.. position to f~l:r a.:.q_;ue this poi!":.t ,

tr1s a-reate:r Eis incidence of interdo:p.:mdencies.
It

i3

useful :Ln our 2.nalysis of structura1 :l.::1terc_;331errdence tq a..-i_.-~ 1 -

re:lational i.nt,2-rdependencies.
·:rhe first factor wh.ich affects incidence of these rel ati,Jnal inter··
cl.epar1:.:'!.r~ncies is size.

Taking the exai.-rn:ple of two. peo:ple who desire one

reso:.:rce, the co1'-a~plsxity of the structur? is determined by the extent to
~-;hich they a.ra mutually dependent .
1-:.--:-.turc; ,

t.ne po,-;e:r relationship is

pend-ancies

is

unidirectio:1al .

If the structure is hierarchical in
asynunetrica.l in that the flow of d•.:;-

Gne might say in·tnis case that an inJi-

.

-

•

12

do
0

c;::.tL1ot ;~;et :\ ~.:.o do -3. ti.yt~-:i:::-\g he woul-..1 not othsr.-ris e d.o •

.;: ·,·,,r,:-._:-~ relatio.:: s:nip is then considered unirlirectior1al ancl asyrnrrretrical .

Ti::.U.3, the si~:_;>lic l. ty of the po:-rnr relatior..ship in this case is determined.

oy the lack of mutual d.epe~1dancies.
While. still considering the relationship betw~en -two people and

,.,

0 1.1e r3source, relatively complex for:ns of mutuaJ. dependencies could be
dsscribed in the follo:-fing manner :
(,

\ l.

n

.LJ'

).

so~e resource,(A

~>

i .,e ., B depends on -A for

3)

A a.:nd. B mutually de:penc.er..t ~lpon one

(2)

2..:·10-c.hB~~

: ·o::c a resource

coth 1:2. rties desire, L\ << ">> 3)

(J)

<<

3 :::~or.:inant ovs-r A~ (A

are

a.s

3)
i-: i.~

can say

two in.ii viclu2c.l3

Eo-;.,;ev-:::r, nors coEplex types of

A2

a rule,

wt'£l:

the size

i3 increased. tb.2 f~LL;1::e:r-

of de_pend.,: 3nci~3 3

!-~~1 example· 9: this is found. ir.. a sirr1:pla hierarchy .

A sir,I:lc hierarchy, ·or a

0

tree of dependence" occurs:

if, and only i:, all elenents in the collection are directly or
indirectly connec tad to - a simple s:..1.perordi:12.te elen:ent and. elements a.r;~J only ctirectly or indirectly connected. with each other
tb.ro1..:.:sri a common superordinate element . 15 ·
L,J;I)orte uses the follo~,11.r.g illustration to demon3trate thi3 simple hiera.L'chy· wne~-~~ the dependence 9f elements - is upon one- s~p2:!:'ord.inate

element.

l"

_ _ _ _ _ __ __. c.!

2- --

____
1-.:;.____________
~J

J
-----0·

n

'.J

~

------' .J
- - - - - (1

5

- - - -- - - - 0V ~

6

l~

action wh-::;re all !::.s::; oers. within the structure ar:-= !:1ut·.ally deperident. .
ThL~ fbrm o:r r::.:ic·1:::-,-roc'.."17 int2rdepend2Ece between all mem.l1ers is :lllus.

tratad iE the follo~dr!.6 matrix :

;7

c,.

J

!...~

...

. .....,

_L.:..t~~>.J _-.;si .J.~ .~:7.

i

••• -~ ··• • · - - . .L. ••
..,; i.• .... '. ~, }__ ) l.,...:::,

i::1

·~L 1.-: C (;.1~1:;() .r ~r C-2.:.L
'II'

•

••
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lz-:;a ole ir: c,,:,:-1c:cete str 1...:.ctu.res of hu::1an i:::'lteraction.

This tyfe, the "sarai-

g
.r!tt:W L118 .J': ;

A collection of ele~ents forms a semi-lattice if, and. ot:.ly
:singl '.:- .element i:i th·3 ·~ollection IEay be connected directly to any
o+h.-:.··" <:-in;::rl.c, elr:,,;;::,r,t ar,-·1 .10 ·c·'iro-le element is .in a supe:::-ordinat\j
all

r;r;~i~n-t~~ ~:;t;er ~lcmsri~;·_-o,~

LaJ?'orte uses a figure similar to the following to . illustrate this typs of

interdependence:

intszaction allows for an ir.c:r·eas1:; i!;. the 1x1ssible m.1..~,:s :c of relational

incid.Jncs o:· :rslatior:al interrie_pe:nd_f;llci2s.
....::...-.
I.J .l.

CA

-.,_

s :.~--~~' ~· ,-i_~ ~;

.. ,

'

the

.
r.,

:_ -~ -;~ ..

a, city

c0.t.ri.1c:1l •

T£·

..!... L f

co:.111.:.;l.l had.

OI

in tl-£ l)ol l tics c:f:' fina1cing hos1.Jit2.ls an.d is 3.ble to account :or the
d.if.ficuJ.-:~L~:3 of go.Lng th.ro~h

·t/:.a

date -the low-3r inco~ne groups.

and

........
'..,)'

:)olitical _p:::::oc.-23s.

The cthe:r meiilbers o: the council have or"ly

have some expert,ise

l~1

t:1~ field. of hospi ta.l

fin2.ricing a.n d politics, an.d the ot:1e:c nemcers of ti!3 cou::-:.cil a:-ce de_pand.ent
Ho;-.,ev2r, r1.e:,~c:e:rs A, _-3, a~d. C 2,re all j_nterde:pen.ient

:i_po:u. this '.~cowled.ge.

b,3cause each deper:.ds on the other two :fer: a ce1. ~ain kr..o:dedgo 1-rhich he
lg,cks.
council to vote affirm2.t:i.vely on t::is issue

i11

order t,:; i:mve the hoti_p:.tal

built.
clefii1ed

.:~

c ...... .:.~_:..

the inci~ences of ttsse

Eo~rev2:::-, if this co,mcil h2.d. to act upon ot:-,e:c is2ues--:;,J'--lblic housing,

nw::erous.

:f unc ti m'ls of the

£..
('
.r.·1--r.,t, t~
._.L!l· -~.•· .'. _1 !, J_~::
J -.. "

. ~-':·:;-~
·~-I-.
7~
'
• •

r.t~:1

-~ '1 r""'' .,....__r"\ -- ........ •
·~ ··i,-·,. ·-- ·.-. r·:! •• ·.- ..... 1 C
i_ ;. ..,. "'rV ::,;·· ·. · """1 --~ ···- .i:
,.) A.:. ;. ·-···'--= c. __, ·::: ,:,, •
C ,.-• .L·,::,~ - -~'
1
.1.. .•. '.:_;

~

of

.Z':...2ctio.c12,,

.

.

l:CC::C82.Slr'.g

e. .

lS
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wa::, able to ns.vs a:i. impact upon the ~ecision made -cy the council..,

also the

J~c..-i..i.

6 er of a grocery store

i::-.;.

tha downtowr1 area.

He 1.s

Wlt:~. the }",..11owl-

'iecisim:.:; on food stamps a.nd on urb2:~ 1:enewal .
knowledge o.f so.rr.e of the aspects of tie effects of

&~

expa.;:1sior: of t:ie

food sta.G1p }Jrogram a.nd of the effects of urban renewal on the ousines3
comrrn.111ity ir. the downtotm area,
r,
l• ,.,.

these issue areas .

in:fluential fr tb:;

.,

'I.

• •

Cl.CClSl0:1S

is a.cti vely i:1.volve.J.

::..D.

the

·turr; anct hS,,f3 a 1ir~Ld. ar iinp.:..1. ct o:r1 ·the l.3-e2is·ions I:-!ciCte by- tl~e colmci.l .
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\ ;EG1'ION T'.jiiQ:

.ANALYTIC COMPLEXITY
This discussion of the factors of analytic complexity
will be separated into two parts.

The first part will cover

some of the more salient issues concerning the limitation of
the political ,analyst in perceiving, conceptualizing and ·
describing the complexity .of concrete structures of interaction.
This discussion is important for the debate between pluralists
and anti-pluralists .in that the latter has criticized the former
for oversimplifing their methods of observing the political
_process.

The second part will briefly point out the differences
in degree of complexity of the structures of analytic frameworks
of the pluralists and anti-pluralists.

'"\. . .
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LIMITATIONS OF ANALYTIC COMPLEXITY
The complexity of political analyses is contingent upon

the number and differentiation of variables and concepts
used to describe the structures of political interaction
and concrete behavior.

.1

The central issue to be developed

here is the explication of the limitations which circumscribe
the perceptions of the political observer~

While.the

difficulty of separating the .,objective reality" which the
observer perceives and the subjective preconceptions which
skew these perceptions should be obvious, the intent of this
explication of the limitations of the political observer is
to demonstrate the ways in which these limi·tations simplify
the diversities of the political process.

~'1'
d'-...

Primarily, human deficiencies of observation and compre-

hamsability of perceptions limit the number of variables
which can be analyzed by any one political observer.

In his

article, t"rhe Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two:

Some

Limits on our Capacity for Processing Information••, George

Miller posits the conclusion that human beings possess a
rather small capacity for making absolute judgments
concerning the differentiation of unidimensional sensations,
3

.

(e.g, differences in levels of pitch, etc.)~ By our nature,
he argues, we use numerous devices to compensate for this
human deficiency.

Three of _the most important of these are:

(a) to make relative rather than absolute judgments;
or if that is not possible, (b) to increase the number
of dimensions a.long which the stimuli can differ; or
(c) to arrange the task in such a way.that we mak~~
sequence of several absolute judgments in a row. 1t11 ....
0

20

.Furthermore, Miller argues that we

0

recode 0

information" into more "manageable chunks".

0

bits of
Through this

simpiification or symbolization process Miller argues that
<

z:;

we are capable of dealing with complex perceptions. --DeTocqueville develops the notion of

0

general ideas "

to explain how the hun1an mind can compensate for its

perceptual inadequacies.

The usage of general ideas allows

the human mind to see similarities in diverse perceptions.
which would otherwise be "lost in the wilderness of detail".

Moreover, these general ideas- .. permit human minds to pass
judgment quickly on a grea_t number of things; but the
conceptions they convey are always incomplete and what is
.

f'J·~

gained_ in extent is always lost in inexactitude • n r"'!:t
'l'hese
usage of'

0

general ideas" are to be found in the common

language.

As Landau argues:

All languages typify and categorize and we need no
reminder that ordinary language does so in a crude,
ambiguous, and often contradictory manner--and that_
7
the observations it directs are of a similar character.
If ordinary language is so "crude 0 and "ambiguous 0

,

then i t ,

is important that the political scientist sharpen ordinary
language to make i t more exact .
occur in this sharpening process.
of relevancy~

But two basic problems
The first is the proble m

When a political scieniist develops concepts,

they must be relevant to the concrete structures of interaction he is observing.

The term, concept, is applied in

this context to describe a set of characteristics cir

,·

attributes~ ~ The intension of the concept is delimited by
its correct definition.

The extension of the concept is

21

is defined by the "class of all actual or existent things
which the term (i . e., concept ) correctly applies to or

The methodology of a scientific inquiry is the way in which

the intensive characteristics of concepts are organiged and
applied to the observable concrete political structures of
.

.

.

•

interaction.

It

The basic problem with the use of methodologies

is the potential of incongruities between the conceptions
used by the political observer and the characteristics of
the observable phenomena.

The second problem in the use of concepts is that they
tend to become rigified.

Because of the potential for

incongruities, ( as noted above), it is important that the

scientific observer not mistake the qualities of the concept
for those observed.

The scientific discipline is based upon

flexibility and initiative, and it is dangerous, and often a
ti

source of distortion, when these qualities are lost . . Thus,

as Landau points out:
Care must be exercised that they (concepts) do not
harden and rigidify--a danger that always results
when we forget that an analytic construction is not
a thing in a material sense. 13
Landau· also points to the potential distorting effects
of the use of metaphors in political science.

He argues that

metaphors are not only commonly used .in political discussion;

they are essential: uwe could scarcely get along without
them .

., l'r

.

•

.
However, descriptive
metaphors are a source of

"distort.ion and misrepresentation.".

For the perceptions of

properties imposed. by the use of the metaphor may not have
·,.

t!q

names."

any direct correlation with the percepti6n of the properties

22

which the metaphor ismearit to describe.

In short, the

language used to describe perceptions of concrete behavior
and events often structures the perception of the behaviors
and events, rather than the inverse.

14

An example of the implicit use of metaphor can be found
in pluralist utilization of the idea of a marketplace to
describe how the political process functions.

As in a

marketplace, there are many different leaders (i.e., sellers
· of wares) who both react to and pressure constituents ,
(i.e., consumers).

Interest groups and individuals (i.e.,

buyers) come into the political decision-mak ing process to
use poli t.ical resources in order to receive goods and -

services, (i.e., commodities) .

The political decision-

making process, (i.e., the marketplace) , is open to those
who are willing to utilize their resources; however some
individuals or groups only use their resources to directly
specific issue areas which directly influence specific
issue areas which directly affect themt ( i .-e., they only

go to the marketplace on the days that there are specials
on the comm6dities they wish to purchase).

As in a market-

place, there are decisionst (i.e.; transactions ) made, and
the method of analyzing who exerts power and/or influence
involves the investigatio n of who makes decisions (transaction s)
a~d who benefits from these decisions, (e.g. the buyer· or
the seller)~

Like commodities, issues only exist in ~he

political arena when they have commanded the ''attention of a
i .[,

significant segment of the political stratum. u · --· Rather than

23

extend this example,· we can see that the implicit use of'
the marketplace metaphor has affected the pluralistst
description of the political process .
Metaphorical description should be used as an organizational device to stimulate

0

that may be quite productive."

a reorganization of thought
In this way, the "metaphoric

transfer--the substitution of analogy for actuality--may
serve to reveal new attributes or disclose old ones in a
new light, thereby adding to the corpus of our knowledge.

0

tlo

Many metaphors, however, become reified or rigidifie~ .
In this case, the metaphoric transfer has taken effect and
the metaphor is accepted as a literal descrption.

0

To take

a metaphor literally", argues Landau, "is to create a-myth
and the more conventional myths becomet the more difficult
they are to dislodge."

n

-Thus. Landau is not arguing against

the use of metaphorical descriptions; rather, he is arguing

for the proper. ·usage df metaphors to represent that which
has been deliberately conceptualized .
We can now see that whether we call our generalized
descrptions, "manageable chunks of information", "general
ideas••, concepts, or metaphorical descriptions, an indeterminacy exists in the correlation between the observer's
descriptions of his perceptions, the observer's actual
perceptions~ arid the concrete behavior and events perceived.
The importance of these distinctions amounts to·the increasing
simplicity and decreasing precision as we f6llow the line
from the

0

objective", and observable

0

reality" to the

percentions of this ''reality'', and to ·the description of

!,
2 ~r

these perceptions.

In this way, both perceptual and descrip-

tive inadequacies limit both the number andtype of variables
and concepts which can be analyzed by any one observer.
However, this is not to say that analytic simplicity
.should be maximized; rather, the acceptance of these
limitations points to the indeterminacy of the correlation

of our perceptions and descriptions of political phenomena.
Thus, even though a · political process may be co'm plex, -we may
not be able to perceive or to describe all or any of the
complexities of th~t process.

STRUCTURES OF POLI 1rICAL ANALYSIS

While the relevance of the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm
to the

0

science" of politics has been subject to serious

debate, there appears to be little evidence with which to
counter the hypothesis that various analytical frameworks are
accepted by a part of or a majority of the community of
political scientists.

For our purposes, here, an analytic

framework may be defined as an accepted theoretical · or
empirical method v1hich is used to approach the study of
various aspects of the political process, or of political
analysis.
While a complete investigation into the complexity of
analytic frameworks is not possible within the constraints
I

of this essay, it ;will be tiseful for our analysis of
pluralism to investigate how the structures of analytic
frameworks differ in terms of complexity.
rr~he complexity

of the analytic framework is contingent

upon the number of variables that fit into the conceptualization and (2) the openness to different types of observable
phenomena.
The complexity of the structure of' analytic frameworks
is contingent upon (1) the number and differentiation of
frameworks allowed within the confines of the academic
community; (3) the relational interdependencies of frameworks,
(e.g., the lack of any prevailing or predominate frameworlr

and the presence of competing frameworks); {4)
~

variability

of frameworks over time to make them more relevant to existing

26
politic al knowled ge.
It is my content ion that we can describe plurali st and
anti-pl uralist analyses as ·two differen t structur es of

analytic framewo rks.

I will attempt to demonst rate that the

structur e of plurali st, analytic framewo rks is simpler than
that of the anti-pl uralist, analytic framewo rks.

While any·

one politic al theoris t or scienti st may utilize one or many
analytic framewo rks, the categor ization of politic al
theoris ts and scienti sts into.the categor ies ·of plurali st and
anti-pl uralist involve s a structur e of analyti.c framewo rks.
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Underlying the structure of analytic frameworks utilized ·
by pluralists is a general concensus on hov, power and/or

I will attempt to point out

influence should be studied.

this concensus by describing the methods used by Dahl, Polsby
and Banfield.,

16

The underlying asstunption taken by these three theorists
is that the political analyst must study the actual exercise

By so doing, they attempted to

of' power and/or influence.

make the distinction between potential and actual power.
As Banfield states, "it is necessary to observe influence
/1,j

'at work' rather than 'in repose'.

Dahl argues that the

rW.tr\

"potential power a ~ enjoys bears no necessary relationship
to actual power he wields."

:J..o

To determine the 2.ctual power exerted by individuals
-and groups, pluralists assume that the decision-making
process must be analyzed~

_As Polsby contends:

It is possible to distinguish three kinds of data with·
respect to decision-making which.often serve as indices
of the power of actors: one may ask (1) who participates
in decision-making, (2) who gains and who loses from
alternative possible outcomes, and (J) who prevails in
decision-making.~'

Or in the words of Dahl, community power must be studied by
a "careful examination of

a series

.X·~

of concrete decisions." . ,:, -

Because of the difficulty in analyzing the vast number
of decisions made in the political process. pluralists- find
it necessary to select "important decisions 0

•

While Banfield

and Dahl give us little criteria upon ~hich to base this
.,

"'

v

. -..,• ~ - , . ; ;
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selection, Polsby is quite explicit)
1.
2.

J.
4.

How·
How
are
How

many people are affected by outcomes.
many different kinds of community resources
distributed by outcomes,
much in amount of resources are distributed
by outcomes,
How drastically present conL-ruunity resource
distributions_ are altered by outcomes. ~3

Furthermore, the pluralists believe that it is necessary
to uexamine a set of 'decisions' in different •.issue areas'

in order to determine what kinds of people we-re the most
9-'f
influential. n
From this brief outline of pluralist methodology, we can
see there is little differentiation among analytic frameworks
utilized by pluralists.

Within the structure of pluralism,

then, there is·a dominant analytic framework which has little
variation over the time in which these books were written.
For these· reasons we may say that the structure of' analytic

frameworks is simple.

"\.
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A!:n'I-PLURALI SM:

STRUC'I'URAL COMPLEXITY OF ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS

The complexity of the structure of the anti-plurali sts '
analytic framework, (~s opposed to that of the pluralists')
may be seen as a result of the anti-plurali sts' .· dissatisfact ion

.with the pluralists' emphasis on the examination of the
decision-mak ing process -1:o determine the extent · to which power
is exercised in the political arena~

While anti-plurali sts

agree that a close evaluation of the decisions made is
. m$rited, they see it as only "one face of power.

0

and Baratz, in their article, .,Two Faces of
Bachrach
..7

;~

Power

0
,

.

.

argue th~tjthe analytic framework of pluralism does

not take into account the fact that political· power is often .
used to narrow the scope of the decision-mak ing process.

As

·we saw in the pluralists' analytic framework, the -exercise of

political .power was examined by an investigatio n of th9
decision-mak ing process.

As Bachrach and Baratz argue:

Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies
to creating or reinforcing social and political
values and institutiona l practices that limit the
scope of the political process to public consideratio n
of only those issues which are comparativel y innocuous
to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing thisi B
is prevented for practical purposes, from bring to the
fore any issues that might in their resolution be,
seriously detrimental to A• s set of preferences. j-tp
Thus, the anti-plurali sts argue that by only examining
the issues decided upon in the political process, the extent
to which the political obser-ver can investigate the actual
exercise of power ·is severely limited.
However, does the study of' unon-issues

0
·,

(i.e .• those

which do not enter the decision-mak ing process) affect the
so ·- calJ.ed '' science .. of politics?

Pluralists, such as Pols by

JO

argue that the emphasis of political science on °non-events .. ,
rather than °policy-rnaking events•• presents "insuperable

obstacles to research._ ..

tfFor every event, · (no matter how

def'ined) that occurs there must be an infinity of' alternatives.
Polsby argues that as the number of

0

non-events11 makes

research difficult, the necessary question emerges: .. which

non-events are to be regarded as significant?u

JB Who

is to

determine · the "real" importance of an issue ·which does not

enter the political process?
A wholly unsatisfactory answer would be:. certain
non-events stipulated by outside observers without·
reference to the desires or activities of communitv
residents. ~q
~
However, Polsby does concede that a satisfactory answer to
this question can be determined by examining a

0

signii'ica.rit 0

number of citizen demands which were not acted upon in the
political process.

~v

The structural complexity of the anti-pluralists' analytic
frarnework is, in part, a result of the differing methods of

examining the factor of non-decision-making.

For our purposes,

here, it is not possible to cover all of the ways in which
the pluralists hav-e attempted to analyze the 'two faces of
power 0

•

Instead1 I will attempt to outline some of the more

important ·ways. of analyzing the constraints of the political
process lNhich have been utilized by anti-pluralists.

One method of analyzing community power relations advanced
by

Crensen attempts to find a correlation b~tween "the neglect

of' air pollution issues and characteristics of local :political
"\.,

~ i

· leaders or institutions.If While he admits that any categorical

0

~?

Jl

statement concerning the importance of air pollution would.
perforce be

0

value-laden .. , he attempts to determine the

ltissue-ness bf air pollution by making a comparative study
of 51 .American cities.

By tabulating the results of a

survey of ten community leaders--mayors. chamber of commerce
presidents, etc.--from each city, he attempts to make
statistical relationships "between the neglect of the air
pollution issue and the political characteristics of local
. t·ions. sa
t·1. -cu
.
}.ea.d ers ana., 1ns
Another method, used by Greenstone and Peterson in Race

3:1

and Authority in Urban ·Politics, involves a comparison of
the implementation of the Community Action Program in.~five
major cities--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia
Through this comparative analysis they attempt

and Detroit.

to test some of the pluralist assumptions and conclusions and

,.q

to study the ~plurality ·of forces that bear upon policy
questions."

Although the results of this important study

of urban politics will be discussed in sectionthr~e, it is
important to note that they include in their analytic
frameworl-c such ·.·variables as social role interests and

associated ideologies, race relationships. regime interests
and ideologies of' machine and reform politicians, social
.n;representativeness of leaders"', relationship between
bureaucratic efficiency and citizen participation, and
../

consensual and coriflictual bargaining methods.

3 ~)
.

.

In his account of Atlanta politics, Clarence Stone

?G:,
~

attempts to show that there is a "system bias" which gives

J2

certain groups a "positional advantage
process.

0

in the political

By studying the issue of urban renewal, over a

20-year period, (1950-70) Stone directs his attention to
the way in 'Which the political system converts ·citizen
rro do this, he investigates the less observable

demands.

characteristics of concrete behavior such as the mobilization
of popular support. official disposition on proposals, and
the implemetitation stage.

In this way, he attempts to

demonstrate the constraints of the political system by
examining the capacity of groups to

0

bring about or prevent

,;,-"'"1

change."

.5

I

-

Thus, we can see that there are a number o.f different
methods of analyzing urban and cornmuni ty pmver :!'~elationshi:ps
in the political process.

The difficulty of examining the

constraints of a particular political process has tended tq
allow for competing analytic frameworks within the antipluralist structure.

:i.\'1oreover, many of the anti-pluralists

make little attempt to refute the pluralist theory of politics,
rather, for the most part they are in the process of altering

and revising the pluralist theory to concur with thBir
· empirical findings.

Through this revisionist process anti-

pluralist:3 have added to the corpus of our knowledge of urban
and community political processes.

For these reasons we

.can see that the structure of analytic frameworks utilized

by anti-pluralists is .more complex than that used by pluralists.
Howaver, it is important to notfthat (as was pointed

out in the first part of this section) our methods of

JJ

~nalyzing concrete structures of interaction are limiied
by the inadequacies of our perceptual.capacities.

By

attempting to examine the less overt behavior of individuals
and groups, our methods of investigation tend to envelop
erroneous observations.

As we will see in the following

section, the different methodologies used by pluralists and
anti-pluralists have resulted in differ~nt descriptions of
the political

process.

Because of the indeterminacies

involved in our methods of observation, it is important

that we not completely discount either description of the
political process.

\. .....
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SPGTION TII:

DESCRIPTIVE COI':IPLEXITY

Public policy is formulated through bargaining and negotiation
among a plurality of individual, groups, agencies , and
interests. No single proposition in the literature on
Ame~;can do~est~~ pol_icy fo~m:tion as been so convincingly
argu~d, elaoorat~d, and documented. ·

1

In this section , I will examine some of the descriptions of
ths concrete structures of political interaction made by descriptive
pluralists and anti-pluralists.

This distinction betwen descrintive
.J.;

.

pluralists and anti-pluralists should not be confused v.Ji th any
:!:1ormative statements concerning the political process..

This is

not to say that the descriptions of the political process made
by

pluralists and anti-pluralists are by any means " objective;"

rathe·r, for · the purposes of this essay, an analyical distinction
between descriptions and prescriptions · is helpful.

Im~portant to

note is that it is . not possible within the cotistraints of this
paper to analyse all of the pluralists and anti-pluralists.

As

w-a.s done in the previous section, certain of these political

scientists vrill be selected~

As noted at the outset of this esay , the descriptive
pluralists and anti-pluralists will be discussed in terms of
complexity .

This is not to say that any political scientist or

theorist describing politicai complexity is considered a pluralist,
for this definition wciuld be so broad as to lose its specificity.

.

J.5

ff2SCTIIF'I'IVE GOI,IPLEXI'rY:

PLURALISM

This discussion of descriptive pluralists will center around
2
-the v:orks of Dahl and Polsby. ~vhile their descriptions o:f the

political process are somewhat different, I will attempt t-o
emphasize their similarities.

By analysing the political process through an investigation
bf

the decision-ma.king process, the descriptive pluralists £'ind

that the political stratum is open to any dissatisfied group .
..:I\

s Dahl argues:

The independence, penetrability, 2.nd heterogeneity of the
various segments of the political stratum all but guarantee
that any dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the
political stratum, but to have a spokesman does.not insure
that the group's problems will be solved by political action~~1
F'or the purposes of our discussion of' descriptive pluralists, I
the reasons
will attempt to outline/ why the pluralists make this contention.

Pluralists assume that the actual power exercised ·by citizens
in the political process bears no relationship with their
actual power resources.

This assumption is important to their

conclusions in that they admit that there is considerable inequalities
in the dit3tribution of economic resources within the corr1.--nuni ty.
In examining the d2cision-makipg process, they find that the.·
pol.i:tical stratum 1Has "dominated by many different sets of
leaders, each having access to a different combination of

political resources. "1~

In this way, resources tend to be dis-

tributed unequally, but "no one influence resource dominates all

ths- others in all or even most key decisions . 115
Po~lEiby also argues that decision-makers are not an ingrovm

elite; rathiar, he asserts that "there is a good deal of evidence .

36

..

that decision-mak ers become so by self-selectio n--p~shing themselves into the leadership group by showi!'lg interssts, willingness
to ivork, and competence.,, 6

Thus, we can see from the descriptions

of the pluralists that th!E're are many different interest groups
a:1.d -leaders within the political stratum.

But, if we are to

see the pluralist description of the political process asd

complex, then, there must be interdepandsn ce within ~~he structure.
Polsby argues that the skillful political leader is adept
J..n the -f-'processes of b:Ergaining, negotiation, salesmanship , and

brokerage, and of leadership in mobilizing resources of all kinds." 7

Thus, as Dahl 6bserves:
The relationship between leaders and citizens in a pluralistic
democracy is frequently reciprocal: leaders influence
the decisions of constituents 1 but the decisions of leaders
are also determined in part by what they think are, v.rilJ_
be, or hav~ been the preferences of their constitu~nts .8
Dahl also argues, though, that not all of the citizens are involved
in the political stratum.

How are they to have any influence on
attempts to answer
the decisions of the leaders? Dahl/:cxxx~12 X1.ts this question
by

making the distinction between dirsct and indirect influence.

By direct influence, interest groups and individuals make

demands, and political leaders respond to them.

Indirect influence
those
is defined by the electoral po·w er of ci tizer..s who are and/who

are not involved directly in interest-grou p politics.

Since

the political leader is mindful of his electoral interests, he
will generally act in accordance with his perception of his
electoral interests.
.;_in.c.2._ m, p.·
Ove "1,..,lap_1."'_
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individuals within the political strata are interd~pendent.

As

Dahl points ou.t:

... the man who is a party politician in one role may,
in another, be a member of a particular interest group,
·social stratum, neighborhood, race, ethnic group,
occupation, or profession.9
In this way, the individual will have different types of dependencies.
a political leader, he has to regard his electoral interests
and coalitions of supporting interest groups.

As a member of

his neighborhood organization he may help to generate an issue
to aid their interests in an issue area where we would not
customarily have any interest.

Thus, the overlapping memberships

of groups tends to make the incidence of interdependencies
within the politc~l strata more frequent.
Perhaps most important for the pluralists, issues. resources,
lsadership roles, interest-group coalitions, etc.t all vary over
time.

Thus, "pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues,

and i~sues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions
among int!~rested groups and citizens ranging in thsir duration
from momentary to semi-permanent." 10
~~ccording to our definition of structural complexity, we can
see that the pluralists describe the political process as complex~
in that there are many diffsrent individualst interest groups
and leaders involved in the political process; the incidence
of relational interdependencies are relativ~ly frequent; and
all of these factors vary over time.

In this way, vre can see

that Dahl's conclusion is a description of political complexity:
•.,.

J8

Neither the prevailin g c onsensus , the creed, nor even
the ~olitical system itself are immutable products of
democrati c ideas, beliefs, and institutio ns inherited
£ram the past~ · For better or worse, they are always
open, in some rn.e~.rnure, to alteration through those complex
processes of symbiosis and change that constitute the
relations of leaders and citizens in a pluralist ic
democracy .11

DESCRIPTIVE SIMPLICITY :

ANTI-PLURALISM

Descripti ve anti-plur alists vlill be analysed in terms of
theii descriptio n of the simplicity of concrete structure s of
political interactio n .

I have used the term, descriptiv e simplicit y,

because of .their analytica l emphasis upon the constrain ts in the
political process.

I do not mean to imply that either their

..
. .. . .
ana.Lyses
or d escrip1;io
ns of the political structure

is

simplisti c

_or unsophist oca ted; nor do I mean to imply that 1,ve may character ize

their desciption s in any degree of absolute simplicity .
Anti-plur alists have attempted to modify, revise, and
s·ometi:mes to refute the pluralist s ' descriptio ns of political
complexit y.

They tend to reject the notion that the political

process is completel y open to interest groups, and argue that
variou~ factors within the political structure act to limit the

effectiven ess of interest-g roup participa tion.
Crensen argues that the political system has consisten tly
narrowed the scope of decision-m aking and has neglected the

"real " importanc e of the air-pollu tion issue.

j\Jhile · the decision-

making process appears to be disjointed , Crenssn contends that
"there is a general bias or direction in this disjointed ness .

Decis i onmak.ing is channeled and restricted by the process of
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• •
k ing.
•
12
non-deC1~:1ionma
H

As notGd in section tvrn, the pluralists' analytic framevwrk
dicl not examine the poli tica1 "non-issue . .u

~or
a·ccor~1·~u
-,
.·~""'... .1.0. to

....

tJ:;.e pluralists, the rs are no objective criteria by vvhich to
an issue which does not reach the

decision-making process.

Furthermore, since they found that

the biases of decision-making were non-cumulative and crosscutting,
they considered the political process to be relatively fair.

l\l though Eirensen' s methods of judging the importance of the
air-pollution "issue" are somewhat questionable, the significance
of his study is to point out that there are politic~l de6ands
·which are not incorporated into the political arena.

In his analysis of the urban renewal program in Atlanta, ·

Clarance Stone argues that the political system is

0

biased. 0

He

defines the term in the following manner:
ro the degree that system characteristics work consistently
to favor the selection:of top level officials with predilections
to facilitate actions on some nolicv measures and impede
_
actions on others, then the system ~ay be said to be.biased. 1 ]
1

By this definition, Stone directly counters the pluralist

· conception of non-cu.mulative and crosscutting biases.

"~3ys tern

bias directs attention to the role that public officials play in
advancing some interests at the expense of other no less active
and directly aff~cted interests.
1\n aspect of the palitical procsss which Stone directs his

c~ ttention to is the vmy .in which social demands are converted

into political issues.

Political success in the conversion process,

.tie argues, is o.epen d en·t upon
1

:r"2~Jources

•

"

,

~

,,

.

II

h
~
su;.,s
i.,an t•·ia 1 ,· mu.,_l..L"
t..lp·1·
___ e, ..ana~ expendable

.

.. ·1L~

ano: upon .ravorable CJ.rcumstances."

.

Since the -2--rouns
.._,,
.....
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. imppor ting urban renewa l had these resour ces and had the favora ble
circum 3tance of gainin g offici al suppor t for their poisiti o~.
the seemin gly disjoin ted, incrern sntal approa ch to planni ng in
ths
l\ tlanta consis tently favored t~n.e renewa l issue over/ne ighbor hood
renewa l issue.
Accord ing to the .. revisio nist" theory advoca ted by Stone,
officeh olders are not the neutra l arbite rs of intere st groups
that the plural ists describ ed; rather , they are likely to be
advoca tes of some group intere sts.
In Stone' s case study, the offici als promot ed the urban
renewa l projec t even when the so8ial dislota tions caused by the
·oro iect ~ave rise .to black protes ts.
J::

V

..__,

Rather than elabor ate

on Stone' s case study, it is import ant to note that both Crense n
and stone attemp t to examin e the nopenn sssu of politi cal structu res
to variou s "issue s."

Throug h their descri ptions of the manife st

constr aints of the politi cal structu re, they have argued that
the politi cal arena is not a neutTa l bargai ning ground for intere st
groups ; rather , the politi cal structu re system aticall y limits
the scope of decisio n-maki ng to hinder , (if not prohi~ it),

many differe nt issues from emergi ng as rtpolit ical issues .u
In their wide ranging politi cal analys is of the implem entatio n
of the Comm1..mity Action Program , Greens tone and Peterso n attemo t
.

.

.

~

to examin e and to modify the d ·2 script i ve comple xity of· the .
proce S~3 advoca ted by the plural ists.

;~'lhile it is beyond

the scope of tlis esay to point out all of the variou s ways in
\·ih

ich they hav0 analys ed and have describ ed the constr aints of

the politi cal structu res in five major Americ an cities , it will

L~l

be useful to describe some of the more salient factors of
political constraints .

Greenstone and Peterson argue ~gainst against the direct
.
'.
a:8p 1 ica--cion
o:..f ti,...LL p.... electoral interest model promulgated by the

pluralists~5 As we saw in the first part of this sectiont the
. 1:p 1
. ura 1 is-bs

., · "tJ_ca
· · 1 1 eacer
~
11 y ac t. s
argv.e._._n ·l,na·c t·ne · pOJ..l
gene r.a-.
i:-,

1

accordance with his perception of his electoral interest.

i_. n_-

_

Green-

stone and Peterson argue that thsre are several problems with this
model.

First, the political leader may not know v1hat will or

what will not affect his constituents ' vote.

It is always

problematica l to attempt to determine why someone acts in the
way_ that they do; it is sometimes difficulty or impossible to

determine vvhy individuals vote in a specific way.
Second J they advance the theory of individual ideologiris ·which
effect the "action-orie ntation" of the political leader. · Although

Greenstone 2.ncl Peterson's categorizatio n of ideologies has grave

problems in ascertainihg the reason why a leader (or mayor) acted
. acer t ain
. way, i·t, is
. an irnpor
.
t .an t avtem.pt
+•
in
to explain
a
reason

·.vby leaders do not act according to electoral interests.

Another feature analyzed by Greenstone and Peterson

the

e ffect of the role of autonon101..!s bureaucrad.2 s upon the poli tica.l

system, and specifically upon the participatin g in the Community
Action Program.

Although they do not argue that every city

ha~~; autonomous bureaucracie s, they use an organic metaphor to
Con tend

that, '' the . more au tono-;n_,_._011_'.-=! a,,.., o..,.,.. t:,O...!.-~_
rr-r~·n-; zat•J.~ on '
-

__ ....,

J..1

...

important is a mission for its survival. i 6

J.'v

In addition. to, and

0

'\.

no.,..o.

..)....h,::i
_t.,_ '--' . 1~· -

so~e time 3 a part of, . the ors ai za tional · "need' for survival, is the
1
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In the case of the

autonomous bureacracy, its primary function is th~ rationalization
of decision-making.
HmAfever, as Greenstone and Peterson point out, "rationalit,y
are inherently in tension with each other. 1 7 ·

:::ind span tane i t~r

The tension between rationality and spontaneity in politic~ points
concrete application o.f the theory of
to two basic critic isms of/pluralism. The first criticism v1hich
Greenstone and Peterson advance is that the autonomous bureaucracies
tend to maximize "efficient" methods of governing at the expense
of minimizing the importance of participation of individuals and
groups in the process of government.
The s.econd criticism, which is derived from tt.e first, attacks
o.f partic.ipa tory pluralisrn
one of ths advantr::.ges/which has been argued by prescriptive
.pluralists.

:.:fhile this 'Nill be covered in the following section.

it is is helpful to not here, that one of the prescribed advantages
o.f pluralism is that it allows for individuals and groups to feel
as though they are a part of tl1e governin~ process, and that
J)articipation in groups is ess.ential for the educationaI--development of citizens.

the governmental policies are planned

and carried out through autonomous bureaucracies, then this an
argument that can be

ma.de by

descriptive anti-pluralists who

are also pres6riptive pluralists.
rorr.,.·1
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v.re can c:.lse that their ernpha:Jis on the constraints of the governmental

nrocess is a way of describing the simplicity of this process.
F'or the mobilization o_f biaf;3,or system bias, disallows-·various ~··
....

issuef,and groups f'rom gaining substantive access to the political

•· <

4J

arena.

The effect of ideological orientations of political lead~rs

may decrease the interdependency between the politicians and
their constituents.

The effect of the raticinalization of

r:·overnmental policy by autonomous bureaucraciss decreases the

dapsnd.ence of the bureaucracy upori partisan politics and upon
citizen participation.

The bias of the system, the positional
and

advantage of particular groups,/the rationalization of politics
may all be .factors in decreasing the variability of the political
process over time.

Thus, for these reasons we have used the

notion of descriptive simplicity to analyse the emphasis of

the anti-pluralists' statements about how the political process
fLmctions.

:3ECT ION FOUR.: · PRES GR IPI1 IVE C CICPLEX ITY

In this section I will attempt to demonstrate some bf the
reasons why prescriptive pluralists view the conception of political

complexity as a normative principle to be mtl.ximized..

I will·also

,
. t"
attempt to cover some or"~h e reasons .vmy
pre scrip
·ive anti-pluralists
l;J.

have rejected the application of political complexity in American

government.

Hers again, the constr2.. ints of this essay do not

allow an extended exploration into these opposed viev,points.

It is important to draw a distinction between descriptive
· and prescriptive pluralists and anti-pluralists.

.As shmvn in the

previous section , descriptive anti~~pluralists have attempted to

modify, revise and sometimes to refute the descriptive pluralists •
statements concerning the nature of political complexity~
Prescriptive anti-pluralists, on the other handt believe that
tbe'.,annlication of pluralism in government has undesirable results .
.;..,,.
th
cen··'-rpl
1·ct a bohi·n.--1
.,. .......
_, ... - l, .........
In short,/the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive
0

A,.,-.
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0

c;. (

~·

.._ ... .:..

....

'L...,i..

anti-pluralists is. the difference betwaen the "isn and the
'\ought" statements.

On the one hand, the descriptive anti-

pluralists believe that pluralism does not vrnrk, and on the
other, that it should not be a:pplied. to government.

Descriptive pluralists can al~o be prescriptive anti-pluralists,
in that they view pluralistic democracy as political complexity,

but do not believe that pluralistic complexity is desirable.
'1:he invers1:; also applies to som·s political scientists who B.re

descriptive anti-plutalists and prescriptive pluralists.

However, for the purposes of this essay, and for the sake
C--lcr'~..1."'.,..l.+,:T~.
0

-T.

1
',-·\rl.11 o·v1,·,,.
,... on s_Qer
··1 1
+~ns
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elements of
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p l-u.ralists and anti-pluralists.

J~R1iSCRIPT IV3 PLTJR1-\LI3T3.

Prescriptive pluralists are those who view the pluralistic
conception of political complexity as . an ideal or as a normative
p rinciple,

For the purposes of this analysis, I will cover

three major reasons why th2 principle of pluralistic _complexity

should be furthered:

(1) promotion of tolerance, (2) provision

of neutral means of govermnent,

(.3) socialization of' citizenry

through small groups.
The first contention of prescriptive pluralists is that

the complexities of the politice.l process promote tolerance in
society and in goverrnnent.

.Because of the multiple centers of'

power, no one group is able to gain hegemony~ and thereby abl e
to assert its interests and values upon others; rather, each
group must respect. the preferences of the other.

Groups :which

are highly interdependent must respect the needs and desires .of
others and must allow for differences of opinion advanced by
the other g roups.
Moreover, since tha interest groups which govern are based
Llpon a · subj e etivs conception of interest,

~

no objective

c riteria can determine categorically that one group is wrong
in its cons.i d. era tion of its

O'v\lT1

interest. . The only exception

to this would be when one grou11 ·.vante.d more tha11. its "share" of

the goods and services.
lty•c
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But even this exception h~s a ring of
for one group's" share'' can only be

d.eterrnin2d in relation to the "share"of another group..

rhus,

1

J+6
,·

the chiche, "everything is relative," has significance in this
conte·xt, because of the lack of any objective criterion to judge
H':Jsolutss .
The_ second argument nade by prescriptive pluralists is that
t:1s pluralist system of government is a umorally neutral means
for pursuing political. ends.

1
11

..1.

In this view,

11

each .i..ndi vidual

plays a sigi1ificant, and not simply ·sy:nbolic role, in the political
?

px·ocess of decision."....

If the access to the polit-.li.cal arena is

virtually guaranteed to all groups, each groups will have the
opportunity to play a part in making the laws to which everyone
will obey~ . The process is not perfect in that not all laws
made by this process will be good ones, but the process is
a way of allowing people to gover~ themselves.
Perhaps Alexis de I1ocqueville can be seen as the most important
1

proponent of"' this idea . of sustaining popular control over the
goverrunental process.

He- argues that Americans. absorbed in the

intricacies of their private affairs, often see little need
for participatio n in public affairs.
asked to participate he assum1-=:.s

~'.lhen the individual is

that the function. of government

is to "allow them to· acquire the things they ·.covet and will
not debar th2rn fro:n the peaceful enjoyment of those possessions
,..,

which they have already acquired. ".J

Often the individual believes that the strength of popular
control over democratic institutions can be sustained without
his effort.

But as De Tocqu~ville points out, the predominance

of such a belief will result in the control o:f government by the

fsw over the many.

The inattentive citizens fail to see that a
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f ::: v.r "regulate everything by their ow:'1. caprice ...
Thust this failure to attend to the common welfare results
in the despotic rule of a few.

In this way, the individual

neglects to see that his failure to exercise effort in public
cLi'fairs will eventually rob him of any semblance of conscious

control over his ovm affairs.

Even his though. can be manipulated

ty public opinion when he exclusively £allows his narrow perception

of his self-interest.
De Tocqueville sees that the political efficacy of the
individual must be strengtherled.
are possible:

Two basic means to this end

(1) by giving the individual responsibility

over public affairs and (2) by encouraging participation in
political and civil associations.
First, by entrusting the self-interested individual with
the administration of minor political affairs, his knovrledge

0£ the inter-relationship between nis private interests and the
common weli. .are increas~s.

As his knowledge increases, so will

his interest in.public affairs.

J;~

s he gains confidence of his

political control over these small mattets he will be convinced
of his political efficacy.

This will carry over to his ~onfidence

in associating with others for political goals.
Second, as the society becomes more complex, the individual
mus t act in conjunction with others in associ~tions to gain
p olitical efficacy.

Although it is difficult to draw men out

of their na~row circle of interests, Tocqueville states th~
·i m·o >"r+anr·
~ ,::i
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What are the pluralistic elements in Tocqueville's treatise?
First, he emphasizes that the isolated individual, consumed vrith
•..1...•

:::ir'1 b i 1.,1on

for particularistic,economic gain, is politically power-

less and that the individual is merely mistaken to believe
that he can live apart from the community in which he resides.
8 -:3 cond, he states the normative argument for popular control
over government so that the few will not ruLe instead of the
many.

Third, his emphasis on the need f'or group action, instead

of individual action, is particularly important for interestconsidsred
~ioup pluralism·. For groups are/the motive force in pluralistic
/J,

g overnment. ·

'The third argument utilized by prescriptive pluralists concerns

the tocialization of citizenry through small groups. In this
the face-to-face relationshins of
view, they contend tha t/small groups enable the member of' that
g roups to develop personality and promote loyalty to the state.

As Wolff points out:
In a large society, loyalty to the state must be built
upon loyalty to a multiplicity of intra-social groups _
in which men can find the face-to-face contacts which
sustain their personaliti~s and reinforce their valueattitudes.s ·~
.
mr~mbership · in
~~hrough/small groups the citizen may find a meaningful existence
am.id th2 complexities of modern society.
Thus, the theory of pluralism can be seen •as a bene.ficient
way of g overning society according to a philosophy of equality
and justice.

:t?RSSCR IPr.r IV.E~ t1I'·T'rI-PLUR:.\ LISTS

In this discussion of the prescriptive anti-pluralists I will
attempt to point out some of the criticisms of the three principles
of pluralistic complexity advocated by the prescriptive pluralists:
f\
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First, the concrete applic~tion of pluralism tends to enforce

:~ onformi ty to the interests of established groups .

~-f olff"' argues

that this conformity creates "a strange mixture of the greatest

tolerance for

v1hat 'Ne might call

established groups and

equally great intolerance for the deviaftt individual''.?

an

While

;this principle of intolerance for private individual di~ferences
is contrary to traditional liberalism ; it is supported by the

:1rgument that "i t is good for each individual to conform to
C!
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Hm·,ever, this ty.92 of intolsrance for individual differences

tends to stifle initiative for change both within the group
itself, and consequently, within the governmental structure.
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tend to have explicit guidelines for membership and to have
limited purposes.

Because of these explicit guidelines for

~embership, the groups tends to have an homogeneous constituency.

Ahe n thes e groups are in competition with each oth~r~ as they are
in pluralistic democracy s they tsn.d to eru:orce 1J.nanimi ty upon

their
\ .,

mer:-i"ber:3.

l\ s I;'fcC onnell

points out:
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Strong distaste for anything less than unanimity seems to be
one of the principal characteristics of private associations.
Perhaps the most common response tc» disagreement when it
does appear is to attempt to suppress it, either by appeals
.for unity or by more drastic means9
However , one of the most salient aspects of private associations
:1.s their voluntary nature: an individual has the choice whether
or not to join.

If pluralism is to be based upon the Voluntary

a3sociationsg then it is important that the individual member
has some conscious control over the group.

If the individual

does not have this control , how can pluralistic politibs be anything more than congeries of <lecentralized oligarchies with the
leaders of these "private groupsn controlling its members. 10
McConnell argues that if the Michelian "iron law

01"'

oligarchy"

:.s applicable to· the organization of private groups, thsn these
groups can hardly be seen as the context in which citizens are
capable of determining their own interests.

~vhile; he finds

that the Michelian thesis is not overwhelmingly applicable to
private groups , the important aspect of the nature of these
groups is that the member has few means by which to combat the
t'

power exerted by oligarcllic leadership.
resign.
iEJ

His one recourse is to

rrhis option o_f resignation is what McConnell argues

one mf the differences be tvmen group membership and national

citizenship.

As he points out:

Resignation is the individual's ultimate recourse and the
element that finally distinguishes the private association

from the public body.11

the
Thu s, we c.an see: that/conformity of the individual to the interests
of' the grOUJ) is prevalent in the organiz::1.tion
\

t)f

interE:st-groups.
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j·e can now see that intolera nce for individu al diffenm ces
\lithin groups is limited

by the structur e of the group..

Limitati ons

of the princip le of toleranc e, however , do not stop here.

Accordin g

to the theory of pluralis m, no group can legitim ately be left
ou t of the bargain ing process .

If the politic al system does

not allow certain groups, (eg., migrant workers ), from entering
the politic al arena, then the· plurali st princip les of equalit y
justice must be question ed.

If these princip les are not

question ed , the politic al arena has illegitim ate. admissio n policy

..,rhich di.ffere ntiates betvreen grov.ps.

1

In this case, the limited admissio n illegitim ately denigr~ tes
certain groups and viewpoi nts.

Henry Karie1 has convinc ingly

?,rgued that the governm ent acts

as a

plurali st referee who

"nystem atically favors the interes ts of the stronge r against the
weaker party in interest -group conflic ts. 012

The"refe ree•; then

acts to consolid ate the power of the stronge r groups at the
t(

expense of the weaker ones.

,\

In this way, legitim ate, b~t

brganiz ationall y weake r, interes ts are suppress ed and defeated
in the plurali stic "democr acy. " . ~folff malrns· the analogy of' the
urnpir8 in a basebal l game to demonst rate this function :

It is as though an umpire W9re to come upon a basebal l

game in progres s be tween biE, boys and li ttl.e boys, in which

the big boys cheated , broke th~ rules, claimed hita that

were out:3 ~ and made the li ttls ·boys accept the injustic e

by brute force.

If the umpire undertak es to "regula te"

the
p·nrnc:i
r:::im·ol y- i0nfo-rcin. o- the "ru.1°,::- actua] lv
<.::>:. . . . ... _, by
"·
·u . b.ainu
~
- .!.o
pract:Lc ed, 11e do'.3s no-c ::chereby make -che game a fair one.
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Indeed, hs may actually make matters worse, because if
the little boys 5 et up thsir courage , band togethe r, and
decide to fight it :out , the um~oire will accuse them of
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'rl1e third cri tici~m of the application of the theory of
,

plural~sm to political structures is that it defends a narrow
conce.p ti on of ra ti 0~1.al i t,y.

"Concrete demands are held to be

1 "ll~
-'- .·
.
., are 1rra~1ona.
,
1 . wnereas
.
genera1 d.emanas
rationa,

of a

0

1\ny notion

public interest" is seen as a ploy ussd to defend the

narrow interests of an interest group.15

If there is no accepted

conception of ~"!Jhe public interest by vrhich to limit the demands

of private interests, then there can be no format check upon

the concrete demands of interest groups.

If the nature of

politics is to construe limitations on the legitimate function
of government, then the limitations of government will be determined
by, and in the interests of, dominant interest groups.

The governmsnt cannot be formal or distinct "when it is
bvoken into units corresponding to the interests which have
16
. , 1 e goa 1
. a viao
t s is
. .
.
. , 1 ic
T .... -c'h
•
.-1
l
in-teres
.. e puo
~I
-·
power.
deve_ope0.
If

to be e.ttainsd, it must be· accrued at the expense of interest

,groups which control the governmental process.
BcConnell argues that public interests ; can only result
from national constituencies.

Governmsntal responsibility

to public interests can only exist when these interests are
.knovm. andl. a.re pursued by large hetereogenous constituencies.

"The mean:i.ng of responsibility is empty, unless the constituency
to which respons.ib.ility is mved and actually paid is known, ,,l?
:::1.11.cl

is not ob;::;cured by narrovrly constituted interest groups.
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In this essay I have attempted to demonstr2te how the theory
o-f' pluralism can be viewed both as a description of , and as a

:prs~;;cription for J)Olitical complexity.

dhile the notinn of

complexity can entail many different ideas, I have attempt·~d

to primarily use this notion to describe hbw a plurali~tic
democracy is a complex process.
Athough the topic I have chased to discuis is extre~ely wideis helpful in understan~in g pluralism a ,.:::,. .

a -form of :poli·tical corr.plexi ty.

Perhaps useful in concluding

this essay vdll be a summary of the basic points _I have attempted

to make in the four sections .
In the first section, I attempted t6 point out the conceptual
possibili tics of the notion

of

complexity and to question s.ome

the views of rigidity which have been implied ~vith some
the theories of complexity.
The second section explored some of the limitations of

J}::3rceivin.g, dsscribing and conceptualiz ing complexities .

In

this bontext, I attempted to differentiate the pluralist and
anti--:pluraliE .it analytic framevrnrks by examining their msthodologie s

with which they have analysed the political process.

The third section dealt with the des6riptions of the political
process.

By using a simple anilytic frameworkt the pluralists

d.e r3 (;ribed ths political system a,s complex._

The anti-plu::-al ists,

on the other hand, u3ed a relatively more com1)lex. analytic
.:i:'ra~nework and described a relatively less complex political

system th~n the pluralists .
The fourth section ::1.tt=-.;mptt:d to point out some of the

,J .L fferences between the normative vie-·/-rco.int s of' :pluralist s and
anti-plura lic:its.

By taking such a broad approach to the theory of pluralism
T had hoped to.view this theory .as a whole.

But such a holistic

a~proach is not possible within tha given limitation s of this
analysis.

However, in understan ding a theory of politics I

believe it is important that we look not merely at the analytic
framework of the theory, or at the extention of the theory in
d~scribin g political events, or at the prescript ions for the
political process; rather, we should attempt to l6ok it a broader
IJicture in the hope of understan ding both the complexit y of the

tpeory and that of the concrete behavior and events which tha
theory attempts to explain.
Unfortuna tely, the constrain ts of time and energy have limited
extent to which many of the ideas could be covered in this
e-fJsay.

The correla. tion I have atti2m:pted to make concerns the

con.c2ptua l possibil iti2 s of cori1plexit y, the human limitation s:
of perceivin g and describing concrete structure s of interactio n,
the analytic limitation s of structure s of political inquiry, and
the

o.f a particu.la r

ty:)e of inquiry.

Jhils it is difficult £or me to judge the

success of this essay in making th~s cofrelatio n, I would_lik e
to conclude with a quote from C. :1righ t I.Tills:
I can talrn a small portion of this ver·y 1arge topi.c and
try to prove something about it in some detail; or I can
i-'1.}·
'1-r)q -i·1ole to.,) i
and. t·----y to be me r,:.ily provocati ve.·
~I chaos~
~ours~:-· f~r one thing, it
is more fun: and for another , we outht to try to reason
+o~othn~
~
v
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